In this paper, we first define bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference (BNAI), derive its process-theoretic characterisation and present a compositional verification method with respect to the main operators over communicating processes, generalising in this way the similar trace-based results obtained [J. Univ. Comput. Sci. 6 (2000) 1054] into the finer notion of observationbased bisimulation [Logic and Models of Concurrent Systems, 1985]. Like its trace-based version, BNAI admits information flow between secrecy levels only through a downgrader (e.g. a cryptosystem), but is phrased into a generalisation of observational equivalence [Communication and Concurrency, 1989]. We then describe an admissible interference-based method for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, extending, in a non-trivial way, the non-interference-based approach presented by Focardi et al. Comput. Syst. 8 (1990) 18] and the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol [IEEE Comput. 25 (1992) 39]. The original idea of this methodology is to prove that the intruder may interfere with the protocol only through selected channels considered as admissible when leading to harmless interference. q
Bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference and its application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Introduction
One of the basic concerns in systems analysis is to ensure that programs do not leak sensitive data to a third party, either maliciously or inadvertently. This key aspect of security concerns is often referred to as secrecy. Information flow analysis addresses this concern by clarifying conditions when a flow of information in a program is safe (i.e. highlevel information never flows into low-level channels). These conditions, called non-interference properties [10] , capture any causal dependency between high-level actions and low-level behaviour.
However, many practical secrecy problems go beyond the scope of non-interference. Cryptosystems, for example, permit encrypted private or classified information to flow safely onto unprotected (i.e. low-level) channels despite the obvious causal dependency between the secret data m and encryption key K on the one hand, and the declassified data {m} K (m encrypted by K) on the other. Indeed, any variation of m or K is reflected in {m} K : In this case, the main concern is to ensure that programs leak sensitive information only through the cryptosystem, or, more generally, through the downgrading system. Admissible interference [19] is such a property. In this paper, we define bisimulation-based semantics for non-deterministic admissible interference. It appears that observation-dependent bisimulation based on an observation criterion O or O-bisimulation (called Ocongruence in Ref. [6] ) provides a suitable theoretical framework for expressing bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference (BNAI). As we shall see, BNAI has an elegant process-theoretic characterisation (traditionally called the unwinding theorem in the theory of information flow) and attractive compositionality properties.
Non-interference-based methods have been designed to analyse cryptographic protocols [9, 12] . The basic idea of the method is to prove that no intruder can interfere with the protocol. In this paper, we refine this method by considering as admissible the interference caused by encryption. This admissible interference can be expressed by simply identifying downgrading actions corresponding to encryption actions occurring in the protocol. This paper will highlight two kinds of advantages of the admissible interference-based method over a non-interference-based
one. In some cases, the method permits analysis of the protocol's information flow without the necessity of extending the syntax of the process algebra with encryption and decryption operators. In other cases, it allows harmless interference, i.e. interference that does not correspond to a successful attack, to be discarded at the specification level, rather than screening it manually from the by-products of the verification process. The paper is organised as follows. A variant of the valuepassing CCS, extended with Boudol's observation criterion and its observation-dependent bisimulation-based semantics, is introduced in Section 2. Non-deterministic admissible interference based on observation-dependent bisimulation is presented in Section 3 with its algebraic process characterisation and its compositionality properties with respect to the main process operators. In Section 4, we present different ways to use BNAI in the analysis of cryptoprotocols. More particularly, we focus on confidentiality and authentication properties. These properties are defined in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulationbased proof methods are derived. The method is further investigated through the Wide Mounted Frog protocol in Section 5 and the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with an overview of related and future work.
Preliminaries

Value-passing CCS
We need to start the discussion by identifying a computational syntax around which to structure the investigation. Our work is based on value-passing CCS [18] , modified in various ways as we move along.
We consider the following message algebra, the terms of which, ranged over by a; are defined by: a U vðvalueÞlxðvariableÞlða; aÞðpairÞl{a} a ðencryptionÞ:
We denote fvðaÞ the set of (free) variables appearing in a and we say that a is a closed term when fvðaÞ ¼ Y: Throughout this paper, any closed encryption term {a 1 } a 2 is viewed as the atomic value resulting from the encryption of the closed term a 1 using the closed term a 2 as key. For any (atomic) value v and x [ fvðaÞ; we write a½v=x to denote the setting of every occurrence of x in a to value v and a½v 1 =x 1 ½v 2 =x 2 is noted as a½v 1 =x 1 ; v 2 =x 2 ; and so on. Further, we assume a set of at most denumerable channels, ranged over by c: Every channel is typed, i.e. has a unique structure of terms (messages) which can be sent and received over it. We write domðcÞ to denote the domain of terms that can be carried along c:
Actions of our extended value-passing CCS, ranged over by m; are obtained from combinations of one channel and one term, as follows: † cðaÞ or cðaÞ (output action), † cðaÞ (input action), † t (internal action).
for any a [ domðcÞ: Thus, the set of Act ¼ Vis < {t} contains a set of visible actions Vis ¼ In < Out; where In is a set of input actions, Out ¼ In is a set of output actions and the function ½· : Vis ! Vis is such that m ¼ m: We define the set of free variables of an action m; denoted by fvðmÞ; as the set fvðaÞ if m ¼ cðaÞ or m ¼ cðaÞ; and fvðmÞ ¼ Y if m ¼ t: We say that an action m is closed if fvðmÞ ¼ Y; otherwise we say that it is open, and we use a to range over the set of closed actions.
Agents (ranged over by P and Q) are constructed as follows † 0 (empty agent); † mP (prefix);
where v is a value, x; x 1 ; x 2 are variables, L is any set of actions and O is a partial mapping from Act p to Act called the observation criterion, the intended meaning of which will be clarified in Section 2.2. With this syntax, recursion is dealt with by using agent names, e.g. by defining P ¼ m 1 P 0 and P 0 ¼ m 2 P for the m 1 m 2 loop. We define fvðPÞ; the set of free variables occurring in P; as the set of variables x appearing in P and not within the scope of an input prefix m such that x [ fvðmÞ: When x [ fvðPÞ; we often write PðxÞ (with Pðx 1 Þ Â ðx 2 Þ ¼ Pðx 1 ; x 2 Þ; etc.) and PðvÞ instead of P½v=x (where every free occurrence of x in P is set to v). Otherwise, the variable x is said to be bound. A closed agent, or simply a process, is an agent P such that fvðPÞ ¼ Y: For the sake of simplicity, we often omit the writing of 0 by using the notation 'a' instead of 'a:0':
We shall now define a downgrading process as an extension of a process to model systems and computations of computing entities interacting at different trust levels in an environment controlled by a downgrading system. A downgrading process is then a process in which its set of visible actions Vis is a partition of three sets Lo, Hi and Dwn such that Lo ¼ Lo; Hi ¼ Hi and Dwn ¼ Dwn:
Observation criterion
In Ref. [6] , Boudol has defined the notion of the observation criterion to express an observation of actions with the aim of considering the equivalence between processes. Such a criterion on a set A of actions defines a set B of observables or experiments. In this paper, only observation criteria of Act p are considered. 
Semantics
The operational semantics of a process obtained from this language can also be viewed as an extension of the usual notion of a non-deterministic finite-state automaton where we allow an infinite set of states and where we generally do not consider final states. Let c be a channel, let a [ domðcÞ be such that fvðaÞ ¼ {x 1 ; …; x n } and let v; v 1 ; …; v n be values. Also, let a be a closed action, g a sequence of closed actions, L # Vis and P; P 0 ; Q and Q 0 agents. The semantics of processes is defined as follows
where notation P ! g P 0 stands for a computation of the sequence of closed actions g ¼ a 0 a 1 · · ·a n [ Act p in the process P; i.e. the finite string of transitions satisfying P Â ! a 0 P 1 ! a 1 · · · ! a n P 0 : Given a process P and an observation criterion O; we say that P=O is the O-observation of P: The notion of the O-observation of a process is aimed at defining the process on an observable resulting from its observation through the observation criterion O: Example 1. Consider the observation criteria O Hi and O Lo ; as previously defined. Put Hi ¼ {a} and Lo ¼ {b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 }: Let P be a process having the semantics illustrated in Fig. 1 . Then, the semantics of processes P=O Hi and P=O Lo are given in Fig. 2 . Note that, in both systems, we omitted the looping of t transitions at every state.
We say that agent P 0 is reachable from P; also called a derivative, if there is a computation P !
We shall frequently make use of the set DðPÞ
as the set of reachable agents from P:
Observation-dependent bisimulation
The concept of O-bisimulation 1 captures the notion of behavioural indistinguishability through O: Definition 2. In such a case, we denote P h O Q:
Given processes
21 is an O-simulation of Q by P: We say that P and Q are Obisimilar (denoted P . O Q) in the case where they are related by an O-bisimulation.
The best known examples of this are the criteria defining strong and weak bisimulations of CCS. Both are special cases of criteria obtained from projections. Two sequences are equivalent through the weak criterion O Hi if their visible content is the same. When O is the identity on Act, the strong criterion is obtained through which each sequence of actions is observable and distinguishable from any other sequence. In this way, weak bisimulation could be seen as O Hibisimulation, and (strong) bisimulation could be seen as O Act -bisimulation where O Act is the identity observation 1 Called O-congruence in Ref. [6] .
We denote (strong) bisimulation between two processes P and Q simply with P . Q and (strong) simulation of P by Q with P h Q: More generally, the concept of O-bisimulation is related to bisimulation in the following way. It is important to note that Proposition 3 still holds when O-bisimulation and bisimulation are both replaced with Osimulation and simulation.
Bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference
A drastic solution to the problem of interference by highlevel users on low-level users, which is the cause of a very typical problem in computer security, is to forbid these possible interferences. Several definitions of non-interference have been proposed in the literature (see Ref. [17] for a survey). In Ref. [10] , a trace-based generalisation of noninterference, called strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI), has been proposed. It is satisfied when the low-level visible content of any system behaviour, namely a visible trace, is still a system behaviour. Non-deterministic admissible interference (NAI) was introduced in Ref. [19] . This is a trace-based property requiring SNNI everywhere but through dedicated downgrading channels. The main result of this paper is the introduction of BNAI, which exploits the concept of observation-dependent bisimulation presented in Section 2.4. This section also gives an algebraic characterisation of BNAI through an Unwinding Theorem (Theorem 6) and results in compositionality with respect to the main constructors of CCS (Theorem 7).
Semantics
In order to gain a better understanding of BNAI, we introduce a bisimulation-based non-interference property which refines SNNI and has suitable compositional properties. The following formulation of non-interference requires that a process O Hi -simulate its O Lo -observation. Thus, roughly speaking, bisimulation-based strong non-deterministic non-interference (BSNNI) states that any low-level observable behaviour also has to be a high-level process behaviour, in order to disallow any correlation between a high-level behaviour and a low-level observation.
Definition 4. Process P satisfies BSNNI if
It is not difficult to prove, using Proposition 3, that this property coincides with BSNNI as proposed in Ref. [10] .
Intransitive non-interference refers to the information flow properties that require that systems admit information flow from the high level to the low level only through specific downgrading channels. To capture this property, it was proposed in [13] that any agent P 0 derived from P and executing no downgrading action be required to satisfy noninterference. More precisely, for P to satisfy intransitive non-interference P 0 \Dwn must satisfy non-interference for every P 0 [ DðPÞ: Rephrasing it in the context of BSNNI as the non-interference property yields the definition of BNAI.
Definition 5. Process P satisfies bisimulation-based nondeterministic admissible interference (BNAI) if
Theorem 6 presents an algebraic characterisation of BNAI based on O Lo -bisimulation.
Theorem 6 (unwinding theorem for BNAI). Process P satisfies BNAI if and only if
The Proof of Theorem 6 is presented in Appendix A.1.
A compositional proof method
Theorem 7 establishes the compositionality of BNAI over closed agents with respect to the restriction operator and a weak form of compositionality of BNAI with respect to the concurrent operator. 
1. If process P satisfies BNAI, then P\L satisfies BNAI.
2.
If processes P and Q cannot synchronise on downgrading actions and if both satisfy BNAI, then PlQ satisfies BNAI.
The Proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix A.2. This result extends a similar result for NAI obtained in Ref. [19] . A direct proof that a process satisfies BNAI is, according to Theorem 6, to exhibit for each derivative P 0 ; a O Lobisimulation starting from P 0 : When the transition system obtained from the semantics is finite, this can be done automatically. Many tools, including the Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) [7] , exploits efficient algorithms for checking bisimilarity between finite processes, as developed in Ref. [14] . We are currently designing and implementing at the É cole Polytechnique de Montréal, in collaboration with the Université d'Orléans, a tool to check whether a finite state downgrading process satisfies BNAI or not (available at www.crac.polymtl.ca).
Using BNAI to analyse cryptographic protocols
In this section, we give non-trivial illustrations of how BNAI can be used to detect flaws in security protocols. The main contribution of this section is a general information flow method using BNAI which refines Focardi and Gorrieri's methods for analysing cryptoprotocols [9, 11] where the authors have either to extend the syntax and semantics of CCS before proceeding with analysis or manually to filter out meaningless interference (from an authentication point of view) resulting from the analysis. Improvements given by BNAI depend on the type of security property under study: † in the case of confidentiality properties (Section 5), downgrading actions may be interpreted to counter the unavoidable but harmless interference caused by encryption, and thus the process algebra does not have to be extended with encryption and decryption primitives; † in most of the other cases, particularly for the authentication properties (Section 6), downgrading actions may be used to detect actions which cause interference but do not correspond to successful attacks, before analysis rather than after analysis.
As we shall see, BNAI provides a natural interpretation of the following confidentiality property for security protocols:
No enemy process interacting with the protocol can discriminate, in an inadmissible way, the protocol's behaviour from the behaviour of the protocol exchanging no confidential information.
A second property for security protocols on authenticity can be interpreted in terms of BNAI as follows:
No enemy process can interfere in an inadmissible way with the protocol. We now undertake the task of formalising those properties in the context of our process algebra. Given such a formalisation, we are also interested in deriving corresponding unwinding theorems to verify such properties.
From this point on, we use the variable X to range over process names and variables (including tuples) w; x; y; z; … to range over value terms. A crypto-protocol P involving principals A 1 ; A 2 ; …; A n (specified as processes in valuepassing CCS) is viewed as the following
where C corresponds to the set of public actions used in P:
The restriction over the set C can be viewed as a forced synchronisation of actions made on public channels. Every confidential datum exchanged on a public channel must be properly encrypted, since we assume that such channels are insecure. We shall also hypothesise that all other actions, i.e. not belonging to C; be executed on a secure channel. An attack on P executed by an enemy process E is specified as the process:
Eq. (2) clearly expresses the fact that attackers may intercept any message (closed term) sent out on a public channel.
In such a specification, each principal X has its flown set of private actions, noted HiðXÞ; and we use notation HiðX 1 ; X 2 Þ to denote the set HiðX 1 Þ < HiðX 2 Þ; and so on. Hence, we have Hi ¼ S X HiðXÞ and Lo ¼ C: It is important to note that the content of the disjoint sets Hi, Lo and Dwn is, as we shall see, case-dependent. In general, we shall use the notation c X to denote a private channel belonging to a principal X; and simply c for a public channel. For any principal X; we consider the following natural observation criterion O X describing the actions observable by X which is defined as follows where Hi c ðXÞ ¼ Hi\HiðXÞ: For any two principals X 1 and X 2 ; we may also consider the joint observation criterion O X 1 ;X 2 defined as one might expect.
Depending on the type of security property we wish to enforce, each set HiðXÞ may contain encryption actions and
Encryption is viewed as the sequence of actions e X ðx; yÞcipher X ð{y} x Þ where output action e X ðx; yÞ signifies the encryption of term y using key x (e.g. by sending y and x to X's local encrypter), and input action cipher X ðzÞ then creates a (bound) variable z corresponding to the resulting value (often referred to as the term {y} x ). Similarly, decryption is viewed as the sequence of actions d X ðx; {y}xÞÞread X ðyÞ where output action d X ðx; zÞ signifies the decryption of the term z using the key x (e.g. by sending z and x to X's local decrypter), and input action read X ðyÞ waits for the resulting term y:
Preservation of confidentiality
The major concern of cryptoprotocols is maintaining the confidentiality of classified information which needs to be sent over private channels. Attacks on such protocols take different forms, from direct attempts to steal an entire confidential message to much more subtle attempts to detect exchanges of private data. In this paper, a confidentiality property is introduced which is very sensitive to any kind of inadmissible information flow leading to unwanted secrecy leaks.
This highlights the fact that the principal X can only see actions coming from either a public channel, i.e. from Lo, or its flown set HiðXÞ of private actions. In the case of confidentiality properties, we are particularly interested in the observation criterion O X when X is an enemy process interacting with the protocol. For the following confidentiality property, the set Dwn of downgrading actions corresponds to actions causing admissible declassification of information such as proposed by admissible interference. This type of action is mainly used to indicate the execution of an encryption action as cipher X ð{y}xÞ:
Given any value m; let ActðmÞ be the set of actions containing m non-encrypted in its term (e.g. read X ðmÞ or e X ðk; mÞ; but not cipher X ð{m} k ÞÞ; and let O m be the observation criterion defined by where Act c ðmÞ ¼ Hi\ðActðmÞ < ½HiðEÞÞ:
Definition 8 (preservation of confidentiality). The protocol PðmÞ preserves the confidentiality of message m if, for every enemy process E;
This property may be viewed as ; E : enemy process P E ðmÞ satisfies BNAI:
However, we must note that preservation of confidentiality offers an altered interpretation of BNAI once an enemy process E is fixed, since not every action from Hi\HiðEÞ is considered a high-level action, only those containing confidential information. This property of preservation of confidentiality is illustrated in Section 5 using the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [1] .
We can establish the following unwinding theorem for our confidentiality property inspired by the unwinding theorem for BNAI (Theorem 6).
Theorem 10. Protocol PðmÞ preserves the confidentiality of message m if and only if, for every enemy process E;
The Proof of Theorem 10 is given in Appendix A.3. This particular example has an obvious inadmissible confidentiality break, since it leaks pieces of information about m's content (in this case its parity) without revealing m entirely. Such an attack on confidentiality may be pursued by the following enemy process:
which can evaluate the parity of the exchanged secret message m: Using Theorem 10, we see that this particular protocol fails to preserve the confidentiality of m: Let A 0 ðk AB ; mÞ ¼ c 1 ð{m} k AB Þ [ DðAðk AB ; mÞÞ and P 
while ðP 0 E ðmÞ\ðDwn < ActðmÞÞÞ=O E . tt:
Preservation of authenticity
An authentication protocol is a security protocol where a principal A wants to authenticate a second principal B and/or authenticate himself for B: Successful attacks on such protocols generally take the form of an enemy process convincing B that he is A: In many cases, A initiated the protocol with an enemy process which uses information obtained from a to execute his masquerade vis-à-vis B; but an enemy process may also use information intercepted from public channels, as in Section 5.
In order to work with authentication protocols, we adapt our notation established in Eqs. (1) and (2) . Thus, an authentication protocol where agent A initiates the authentication procedure with agent B is viewed as
where the A i are other processes contributing to the protocol. Also, given an enemy process E; the participation of E in the authentication protocol P; as in Eq. (2), is denoted either by P EðAÞ!B when E tries to impersonate A in the eyes of B (for protocols where the instigator wants to authenticate himself), or by P EðAÞ!B when E tries to impersonate B in the eyes of A (for protocols where the instigator wants to authenticate B). For the sake of simplicity, this paper considers only one-way authentication protocols where the instigator wants to authenticate himself. Thus we shall only consider P EðAÞ!B attacks. The other cases, including two-way authentication protocols, are similar. For authentication properties, the downgrading actions do not play the same role as in Definition 8, the situation being reversed. In Definition 11, the set Dwn corresponds rather to a set of admissible attacks from enemy processes. In other words, by viewing any attack attempt on the protocol as interference, we allow enemy processes to cause harmless interference through specific channels. This situation is illustrated in Section 6 through the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol [23] .
Definition 11 (preservation of authenticity). Protocol P A ! B preserves the authenticity of A if, for every enemy process E,
Once again, this authenticity property may be viewed as follows:
; E:enemy process P EðAÞ!B satisfies BNAI; but this time the interpretation of BNAI, given an enemy process E; is such that the high-level actions come from HiðEÞ and the low-level actions come from HiðBÞ and Lo. As in Definition 8, some actions, in fact those from HiðAÞ and HiðSÞ; are not taken into account. Theorem 12 for preservation of authenticity is obtained by applying Theorem 6. We omit the proof, which is similar to that of Theorem 10. 
The wide mouthed frog protocol
In Ref. [12] , the authors proposed a method to detect this attack using a non-deductibility property and an extension of the Security Process Algebra (which is similar to valuepassing CCS) called Cryptographic Security Process Algebra. This extended process algebra introduces encryption and decryption operators in its syntax and deduction rules into its semantics. Our approach, based on Definition 8, tends to show that information flow methods can be used without the need to extend the process algebra semantics to deal with encryption and decryption, this extension actually being encapsulated in a clever choice of downgrading channels. We back up this assertion with a simplified version of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [1] on which a successful attack was revealed in Ref. [2] .
The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol is used in order to establish a secure channel between two principals A and B on which A wants to send a confidential message m A encrypted with a session key k AB : The protocol assumes that A and B share keys k AS and k BS respectively with a trusted third party S (e.g. a server). The protocol consists of the following three messages:
First, process A sends to S his identifier ðAÞ; his counterpart identifier ðBÞ and a fresh key k AB encrypted with a permanent key k AS shared with S that we note {k AB } k AS : Second, S decrypts {k AB } k AS and sends A's
identifier and the fresh key k AB to process B encrypted using the shared key k BS : Finally, A sends message m A to B encrypted with the key k AB : Process B can now decrypt {A; k AB } k BS to obtain k AB ; and then {m A } k AB :
A well-known attack on this protocol (reported in Ref. [2] ) may be pursued by an enemy process E as follows: first, E intercepts Message 1, swaps B's identifier with his flown and sends it to S: Principal S now believes that A wants to give the session key k AB to E; thus sends {A; k AB } k ES to E who can decrypt it to get k AB : Process E may now intercept and decrypt Message 3 to read the confidential message m A : This attack will be specified in more detail in Section 5.2. First, however, we need to specify principals A; B and S:
Protocol specification
Processes A; B and S are specified using value-passing CCS as follows 
Enemy process
An alternative to using the universal quantifier 'for every enemy process E' from our two properties (Definitions 8 and 11) is discussed in Ref. [15] . Other alternatives are brie y presented at the end of this paper. But they are irrelevant to this particular example since we set up to prove that the protocol does not preserve the confidentiality of message m A : To complete such a task, we only have to produce one enemy process for which Definition 8) does not hold. For that purpose, we specify, in value-passing CCS, the enemy process used in Ref. [12] , which corresponds to the attack mentioned above: From Remark 9 and this enemy process, we can conclude that the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol Pðm A Þ does not preserve the confidentiality of message m A :
The Woo and Lam protocol
To illustrate the authentication property from Definition 11, we use the Woo and Lam One-Way Authentication Protocol [23] . This particular application illustrates the way that admissible interference permits identification, at the specification level, of possible interferences caused by enemy processes which do not correspond to successful attacks. Such admissible interference, referred to above as an admissible attack, has been detected using informationflow-based analysis in [8] .
This protocol is initiated by a principal A who wants to identify himself with authentication to another principal B where we assume only that both A and B share a permanent encryption/decryption key (noted k AS and k BS ) with a trusted third party S (e.g. a server). The protocol is summarised in the following steps:
Message 2 : B ! n B A;
Message 4 :
First, A initiates the protocol by sending his identifier to B; and B responds by sending a fresh nonce n B to A: The latter then sends back n B encrypted with key k AS : Principal B can now proceed to authenticate a with the help of S by sending A's identifier and the last message received from A; both encrypted with key k BS : The trusted third party S decrypts this message from B using k BS ; then decrypts {n B } k AS using k AS and, finally, sends n B back to B encrypted with k BS : Once this last message has been decrypted, B only has to verify whether or not the resulting value corresponds to its initial nonce n B to approve A's authentication.
In Section 6.2, we are interested in the attack on this protocol that was reported in Ref. [24] . In this particular attack, principal A initiated the protocol with enemy process
E; which forwarded all information received from a to another principal B in order for E to impersonate A:
Protocol specification
In order to specify Woo and Lam's protocol using valuepassing CCS, we define principals A (instigator), B (respondent) and S (server) as follows 
where we use the notation established above for encryption channels and decryption channels. We use c iX to denote the public channel used to send the ith message intended for X: We also added the following private channels: † init X ðX 0 Þ : to indicate that X wants to initiate the protocol with X 0 ; † request X ðX 0 Þ : to indicate that X (believes he) just received a request to execute the protocol form X 0 ; † commit X ðX 0 ; xÞ :: to indicate that X is committed to identifying himself to X 0 with authentication using nonce x; † auth X ðX 0 Þ : to indicate that X (believes he) has authenticated X 0 :
The Woo and Lam Protocol can be viewed as follows
where C ¼ S X {c 1X ; c 2X ; c 3X ; c 4 ; c 5X } and we put HiðXÞ ¼ S X 0 {e X ; cipher X ; d X ; read X ; init X ðX 0 Þ; request X ðX 0 Þ; commit X ðX 0 ; xÞ; auth X ðX 0 Þ} and Lo ¼ C: Note that we have not considered downgrading actions yet, since such actions are interpreted as admissible interference caused by an enemy process and hence they only appear in such processes, as we shall see next.
Enemy process
As in Section 6.2, we have postponed the task of constructing a 'greatest enemy process' to future work and concentrate here on the flaw revealed by Abadi in the Woo and Lam Protocol [24] using BNAI. More precisely, we see that the Woo and Lam One-Way Authentication Protocol specified as P A ! B does not preserve the authenticity of A:
To achieve this, we consider the following enemy process executing the attack reported in Refs. [8, 24] 
where we consider any action of type request E ðXÞ or init E ðXÞ as admissible interference from E; putting Dwn ¼ {dwn E }:
Thus, the attack on the Woo and Lam Protocol is expressed as follows
where principal A tries to authenticate himself vis-à-vis E; but the latter uses data received from A to steal his identity and successfully authenticate himself as A vis-à-vis B: In the end, B believes that E is A:
Using Theorem 12, we can see that P A ! B does not preserve the authenticity of A; since Note that a similar approach using non-interference was proposed in Ref. [8] . However, following their analysis, the authors have to filter interference which does not correspond to attacks, such as the trace
Admissible interference allows specification of these harmless attacks, and only failures caused by successful attacks, to be obtained from any analysis of the protocol. Also, by identifying such admissible interference before initiating an automatic analysis of a security protocol, results are obtained with precision and clarity. A cost savings on the software design process might also be expected.
Final remarks and related works
The main contributions of this paper are a bisimulationbased generalisation of trace-based admissible interference initially proposed in Ref. [19] , its corresponding unwinding theorem (Theorem 6) and a compositionality theorem (Theorem 7) with respect to the main constructors of concurrent processes. Moreover, as a non-trivial application
of BNAI, a new approach is proposed in Section 4 for analysing cryptoprotocols. This approach extends the approach based on non-interference presented in Refs. [8, 11, 12, 9] . Confidentiality and authentication are defined in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulation-based proof methods (Theorems 10 and 12, respectively) are derived. Its main advantage over a non-interference-based approach is to reveal flaws with more efficiency by discarding harmless attacks earlier in the protocol's design process and to permit the use of a general purpose process algebra, instead of specialised process algebra extended with encryption -decryption primitives to cope with admissible interference caused by the cryptosystem. In addition to refining trace-based methods, we see that bisimulationbased methods like BNAI detects behaviour-based attacks not expressible through trace equivalence like deadlocks. BNAI has been illustrated in detail in two case studies: the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol (Section 5) and the Woo and Lam One-Way Authentication Protocol (Section 6).
As in any other model-checking methods, the arduous part of a BNAI analysis is the specification step. Indeed, from Theorem 6, given a system specified in our process algebra, BNAI analysis proceeds automatically as follows: first, from the specification and the semantics rules, construct the labelled transition system describing the complete behaviour of the system; next, for every derivative, construct two systems, one by disabling downgrading actions and one by disabling both downgrading and high-level actions; then, construct their O Lo -observations of both systems (by following the O-observation semantics rule); finally, attempt to establish a bisimulation between the systems obtained by using any polynomial time algorithm for strong bisimulation; if no such bisimulation exists, then BNAI does not hold and we stop; otherwise we move on to another derivative.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, the process algebraic approach to cryptographic protocols has also been followed in [16, 21, 22] , where model-checking of security protocols is considered in a CSP-based framework. This approach requires explicitly designing a specific (powerful enough) intruder. Of course, there is always a certain amount of arbitrariness in specifying this intruder, and any modification of the intruder would require a new analysis. In our paper, a more radical approach is taken: the intruder may be any process which can be defined in CCS. We postpone discussion on this crucial issue to the end of this section, at which point we mention some promising research threads.
We are investigating more general properties of intransitive non-interference for processes, inspired by Pinsky's study [20] . It appears indeed that the algorithm presented by Pinsky to construct a minimal equivalence and its associated unwinding condition for a downgrading policy can be thought of as an algorithm to construct the appropriate bisimulation.
Motivated by the ability of the p-calculus, its variants and extensions to model mobility more accurately and, hence, secure distributed applications over the Internet, we believe that admissible interference, and, more generally, intransitive non-interference, should be characterised in terms of such calculi. A further step will then be to extend our compositional and complete (at least for finite-state processes) information flow method to the analysis of cryptographic protocols for such calculi.
In the last few years, many approaches based on the pcalculus have been proposed to analyse security protocols. Below we would like to highlight three on which we intend to focus our attention with a view to further development: Abadi -Gordon's Spi-calculus [3] and its sound but incomplete framed bisimulation-based proof method [2] , Boreale et al.'s variant of the Spi-calculus [5] with its sound and complete barbed bisimulation-based proof method and the control flow analysis for p-calculus presented in Ref. [4] .
Although they are not based on the information flow approach to secrecy, the Spi-calculus approaches are highly promising for the further development of our method, particularly in the way the problem of the 'most powerful intruder', briefly mentioned above, is overcome. We discuss this major issue here: A security property should be satisfied even in a hostile environment. Also, it should be resistant to every potential attacker and when checking this condition is generally an intractable problem. The Spi-calculus overcomes this problem by representing security properties as a weakened form of testing equivalence. Let PðMÞ be a process P processing a datum m: From the Spi-calculus point of view, P preserves the secrecy of m if there is no test with the capability of discriminating PðmÞ from Pðm 0 Þ; for every m 0 : A test nicely formalises the idea of a generic experiment or observation that another Spi-process (a potential attacker) might perform on P: So P and Q are 'testing equivalent' if there exists no attacker powerful enough to discriminate between them. Also, Abadi -Gordon's definition [3] suffers from quantification over all possible contexts. In Ref. [5] , the authors design as an enriched labelled transition system, used to define a weak bisimulation equivalence, which avoids quantification over contexts and leads to a complete proof method. Further research is required for a fuller understanding of these notions and for tailoring information flow techniques to reason over them. But we have already learned that introducing encryption -decryption primitives into the p-calculus leads to a bisimulation method which has to deal with additional semantic rules. Moreover, we conjecture that these rules can be captured by a right interpretation of downgrading and an adequate observation criterion of this enriched labelled transition system in order to admit any interference caused by the in-evitable correlation between a ciphertext and its related text. More recently, an information flow approach based on the p-calculus has been proposed with application to the control flow analysis of cryptoprotocols in Ref. [4] . We conjecture that the simple security properties established by the authors, namely the no leaks and the no read-up/no write-down properties, do not permit analysis of subliminal channels in authentication protocols, The Proposition 13, proved in Ref. [18] , shows that strong bisimulation is a congruence with respect to the concurrent and restriction operators, and that there is a weak form of distributivity of the restriction operator over the concurrent one. 
